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Financial market imperfections can have significant impact on employment decisions of firms. We
illustrate the economic importance of this channel by demonstrating that the responsiveness of employment
decisions to firms’ financial health is quantitatively similar to the much-studied responsiveness of
investment decisions to cash-flows. We use a collage of three ‘quasi-experiments’ used previously
in the investment-cash flow and finance-growth literatures to trace the effects of finance on employment.
Our results suggest that financial constraints and the availability of credit play an important role in
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For more than eighty years – since the great depression of the 1920s – one of the key problems of
macroeconomics has been the explanation of unemployment. More recently, following the recent
ﬁnancial crisis and economic recession, there has been an increasing interest in understanding the
cyclical behavior of unemployment and in particular its relation to ﬁnancial constraints and the
availability of ﬁnancing. While the relation between ﬁnancial constraints and corporate investment
has been studied extensively, comparatively little is known about the role that ﬁnancial constraints
and the availability of ﬁnance play in determining the level of unemployment and its propagation
over time. Such understanding is crucial, as counter-cyclicality in the cost of external ﬁnance (e.g.
Bernanke and Gertler (1995)) may create ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀects that amplify variation in
employment levels over the business cycle.
Theoretically, the cost and availability of external ﬁnance should aﬀect ﬁrm employment de-
cisions for a number of reasons. First, when there is a mismatch between payments to labor and
the ultimate generation of cash ﬂow, ﬁrms will need to ﬁnance their labor activity throughout the
production process (see for example Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988)). As such, when the ability to
ﬁnance working capital deteriorates, ﬁrm employment should fall.1
Frictions in capital markets will also aﬀect ﬁrm employment decisions when labor is not solely
a variable factor of production but rather has a ﬁxed, or quasi-ﬁxed cost component (see for
example, Oi (1962), Farmer (1985), Hamermesh (1989), and Hamermesh and Pfann (1996)). As
ﬁrst described in Oi (1962), such ﬁxed costs include investments associated with hiring and training
activities. Finally, the availability of external ﬁnance may aﬀect employment indirectly through its
impact on ﬁrm level investment. Speciﬁcally, as in the investment-cash-ﬂow sensitivity literature,
in the presence of capital market frictions investment is limited by the availability of internal funds,
and due to complementariness between labor and capital, employment is adjusted for the decline
in capital.
Testing for a causal eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints on ﬁrm employment decisions is complicated
by identiﬁcation concerns of endogeneity and measurement error similar to those found in the
investment-to-cash ﬂow literature.2 Chief among these is the concern that variables measuring
1The argument that ﬁrms must ﬁnance labor payments is similar to that found in the literature on ﬁnancial
constraints and inventory investment: ﬁrms must ﬁnance inventory investment during the production process.
2For two surveys of the literature on capital market imperfections and investment see Hubbard (1998) and Stein
(2003).
1ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial health – such as net worth, ﬁrm leverage, earnings, and sales – are also correlated
with ﬁrms’ demand for labor. Similarly, variables measuring availability of ﬁnance and ﬂuctuations
in the wedge between the cost of external and internal funds such as credit spreads, CDS rates, or
the Federal Funds rate are also correlated with demand for ﬁrms’ ﬁnal product and hence inﬂuence
its demand for labor. These alternatives suggest that employment should be negatively related
to ﬁrm level ﬁnancial constraints and to empirical measures of costly external ﬁnance even in a
frictionless Neoclassical setting.
In this paper we analyze the relation between ﬁnance and labor using several empirical strategies
previously employed in the investment-cash ﬂow and ﬁnance-growth literatures that were developed
to alleviate these identiﬁcation concerns. Consistent with a role of ﬁnancial constraints, we ﬁrst
show using Compustat data that ﬁrm level employment over last forty years is indeed positively
related to cash ﬂow in a large panel of publicly traded ﬁrms. Using the sorting/sample-splits
approach, we also show that the sensitivity of employment to cash ﬂow is higher for ﬁrms with
higher ﬁnancial leverage.3 We next provide evidence from three ‘quasi-experiments’ that enables
better identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of ﬁnance on employment.
First, we follow the approach in Almeida et al. (2010) by using a ‘maturing-debt’ empirical
strategy which exploits heterogeneity in the maturity of long-term debt across ﬁrms. The empirical
tests examine whether ﬁrms with long-term debt maturing in a particular year reduce their labor
force by more than their peers that do not face the need to reﬁnance maturing long-term debt.
We ﬁnd a negative and statistically signiﬁcant relation between maturing long-term debt and the
change in the number of ﬁrm employees. That is, consistent with the presence of ﬁnancial frictions,
when ﬁrms have a large amount of debt coming to maturity which needs reﬁnancing, part of their
adjustment occurs through a reduction in their labor force.
In a second quasi-experiment we analyze the impact of bank deregulation on state-level un-
employment rates. Our methodology follows Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) which utilizes the
introduction of state-level bank deregulation laws across the United States. During the mid 1970s
states began to deregulate local banks by removing restrictions on both intrastate and interstate
bank branching. Deregulation allowed bank holding company to consolidate their subsidiaries into
branches and to open new branches within state lines. Furthermore, states passed laws allowing out-
of-state banks to purchase banks within the state. If bank deregulation relaxes ﬁnancial constraints
3For a similar result, see Sharpe (1994).
2and leads to more eﬃcient capital allocation, we expect that following such deregulation, state level
unemployment will drop. Consistent with such a ﬁnance-labor link, we ﬁnd that post-deregulation,
states did indeed experience a statistically and economically signiﬁcant drop in their unemploy-
ment rates. Similar results are documented by Beck et al, (2010). Using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
speciﬁcation we show that the introduction of intrastate bank deregulation laws is associated with
a drop of between 0.45 and 0.86 percentage points in the state unemployment rate. Similarly, the
introduction of inter-state bank deregulation laws, which enabled banks to open branches across
state lines, decreases state unemployment rates by between 0.84 and 1.14 percentage points.
Finally, in the third quasi-experiment we analyze how a negative shock to bank loan supply
adversely aﬀects unemployment rates. We follow Peek and Rosengren (2000) by exploiting a loan
supply shock transmitted by Japanese banks to markets in the United States. As a result of the
dramatic decline in real estate prices in Japan during the 1990s and the concurrent negative shock
to Japanese bank balance sheets, U.S. aﬃliates of Japanese banks contracted loan supply in US
markets. This shock was arguably exogenous to local U.S. market conditions and yet aﬀected
Japanese bank operations in the United States. Since Japanese bank penetration in real estate
markets was quite substantial in many localities in the U.S., a withdrawal of loan supply stemming
from losses arising due to market conditions in Japan would involve substantial disruptions to credit
availability. By focusing on U.S. lending markets with large Japanese bank market presence, we
can thus analyze the eﬀect of credit supply on local lending and unemployment.
As in Peek and Rosengren, we ﬁnd that lending by Japanese aﬃliated banks did indeed decline
in the U.S. concurrently with the large declines in real estate values in Japan in the early 1990s.
Instrumenting for Japanese bank losses using real estate market movements in Japan, we ﬁnd that
Japanese-aﬃliated banks located in the U.S. contracted real-estate lending concurrently with losses
stemming from operations in Japan. Using this result as a ﬁrst stage in a two-stage least square
speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant link between ﬁnance and unemployment: unemployment increases
by about one percentage point in MSAs where there was a contraction in Japanese aﬃliated bank
lending following the real estate decline in Japan.
To verify that shocks to Japanese real estate values do not vary with demand-side eﬀects in
the U.S., we also conduct a placebo test in which we instrument for non-Japanese aﬃliated bank
lending using the Japanese real estate index. Consistent with a supply-side story aﬀecting only
Japanese-aﬃliated banks in the U.S., we ﬁnd no evidence of a relation between innovations in
3Japanese real estate values and changes to lending by non-Japanese aﬃliated banks in the U.S in
the ﬁrst stage of the regression or between unemployment and non-Japanese aﬃliated bank lending
in the second stage of the regression.
Taken together, our collage of ﬁndings are consistent with the view that ﬁnance is an important
determinant of both ﬁrm-level employment decisions as well as aggregate-level unemployment rates.
As ﬁnancial constraints become binding, ﬁrms need to adjust both inputs of production – capital
and labor. While much prior research has focused on the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints on capital
formation, our empirical results suggest that ﬁnancial constraints seem to aﬀect both factors of
production.
Our paper is related to two strands of literature. First, it is connected to the vast literature
examining the impact of credit market imperfections and investment behavior. It is also related to
a much smaller yet emerging literature on labor and ﬁnancial constraints (see Pagano and Volpin
(2008) and Pagano (2010)). We discuss related studies in these areas when we describe our results.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 1 displays the analysis using
the reduced form regressions relating employment levels to cash ﬂows employing Compustat data.
Section 2 presents the evidence from the three ‘quasi-experiments’. Section 3 concludes.
I. Evidence from Employment Cash-ﬂow Sensitivities
A. Firm-level Data and Summary Statistics
We utilize several data sets in our paper. The ﬁrm-level data are from the Compustat Annual
Industrial Files. We use these ﬁles to collect information on all non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms during the
years 1970–2009 with non-missing observations for the dependent and independent variables in
the analysis. In addition to balance sheet and income statement information, Compustat also
reports the number of workers employed by a ﬁrm. We deﬁne our main dependent variable as the
annual percentage change in the number of employees at the ﬁrm level. To construct our sample
we eliminate ﬁrms with less than 500 employees and, additionally, trim all variables by removing
outliers at the 1st and 99th percentiles.4 This results in a sample of 51,609 ﬁrm-year observations.
All dollar ﬁgures are adjusted for inﬂation using the Consumer Product Index.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the characteristics of the ﬁrms in the sample. The mean
4We use the 500 employee threshold to be consistent with the deﬁnition of small/large business in the U.S. Our
results are not driven by this choice.
4number of employees is 13,075, the median is 1,300. Since we drop observations with less than 500
employees, the number of employees ranges from 500 to 876,800. The mean annual percentage
change in the number of employees, %∆employees, is 6.0% (median=1.7%) and ranges from -70.8%
to 239.9%. The mean percentage change in investment, %∆investment, is 12.6%, while the level of
investment (measured as investment scaled by beginning of period assets) or I/K is 0.082 which is
similar to the magnitudes found in studies of investment and ﬁnancial constraints (see e.g., Rauh
(2006)).
The table also provides descriptive statistics on additional explanatory variables used in the
analysis. We include the variables pertaining to ﬁrm size (in logs), Tobin’s Q (proxied by market-to-
book ratio), leverage, liquidity (measured as cash and marketable securities scaled by assets), asset
maturity, proﬁtability and a dummy for whether the ﬁrm has a credit rating. Appendix A provides
detailed information on the deﬁnitions of the variables used in the paper, their construction, and
their data sources.
B. Employment Cash-ﬂow Regressions
We now turn to study the sensitivity of employment decisions to cash ﬂows. Similar to other studies
in the literature (see e.g., Fazzari et al (1998), Rauh (2006)), we estimate diﬀerent variants of the
following regression:
%∆employeesit = α + βp × Profitabilityit + Xit−1λ + ytθ + ziψ + ￿it, (1)
where the dependent variable: %∆employees, is the annual percentage change in the number of
employees. Xit−1 is a vector of ﬁrm speciﬁc control variables which include lagged values of the ﬁrm
market-to-book ratio, ﬁrm internal liquidity (Liquidityit−1), the log of the book value of ﬁrm assets,
ﬁrm leverage, asset maturity, proﬁtability, and the credit rating dummy. All regressions include
year ﬁxed eﬀects, yt, to account for changing macroeconomic conditions. In addition, we account
for unobserved industry- or ﬁrm-level time invariant heterogeneity by including either four-digit
SIC ﬁxed-eﬀects or ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects, denoted by the variable z. All regressions are estimated with
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors which are clustered by ﬁrm.
The main focus of the analysis in this section is on the sensitivity of employment changes to
Profitabilityit or cash ﬂows which we measure, following standard literature practice, as operating
income divided by beginning of period assets. As argued by Fazzari et al. (1998) (henceforth FHP),
5a Neoclassical model of investment with perfect capital markets implies that the coeﬃcient of cash
ﬂow – βp in speciﬁcation 1 – should be zero. In contrast, a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
implies that some ﬁrms face ﬁnancial constraints due to limited access to external ﬁnancing and
hence must rely on internal cash ﬂows.
The FHP approach has been subject to criticism based on either the endogeneity of the main
explanatory variables – that is, cash ﬂows are capturing investment opportunities not captured fully
by Q – or on theoretical grounds (see for example, Poterba (1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
and Stein (2003)). We attempt to address these concerns in additional empirical tests in the next
section.
We report the results from estimating diﬀerent variants of regression 1 in Table 2. Each column
in the table displays the estimates from a separate regression. The ﬁrst two columns include all
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms while columns 3 and 4 report results for manufacturing ﬁrms only. We use the
same set of control variables in the ﬁrst four regressions as well as year ﬁxed-eﬀects and industry- or
ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects depending on the speciﬁcation. As can be seen, column 1 of Table 2 documents a
positive and statistically signiﬁcant relation between the percentage change in number of employees
and proﬁtability. The coeﬃcient on proﬁtability, βp, is 0.446 and is statistically signiﬁcant at the
one percent level, controlling for a battery of ﬁrm variables and industry and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. A
positive βp suggests that when ﬁnancial constraints are binding, the ability of a ﬁrm to increase its
labor force is constrained by the availability of internal funds. The magnitude of the βp coeﬃcient
implies that a one standard deviation increase in proﬁtability is associated with a 7.6% change
in the number of employees. This represents approximately a third of the standard deviation of
the unconditional percentage change in the number of employees. While this magnitude should be
taken with caution – given the concerns about omitted variables pointed earlier and the potential
endogeneity of proﬁtability – we note that the speciﬁcation controls for lagged values of market-to-
book ratio, ﬁrm internal liquidity, size, leverage and asset maturity.
Turning to the other control variables, we ﬁnd that the change in the number of employees is, as
expected, positively related to the market-to-book ratio and to ﬁrms with longer-lived assets. Other
measures of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnances are consistent with the positive relation between proﬁtability and the
change in number of employees. We ﬁnd that liquidity is positively and statistically signiﬁcant in
explaining the change in the number of employees (coeﬃcient=0.283 and is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1 percent level). Likewise, similar to the results in Calomiris, Orphanides, and Sharpe (1994),
6hanka (1998), Ofek (1993) and Sharpe (1994), we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of leverage is negative
and signiﬁcant.
While the ﬁrst column of Table 2 includes industry ﬁxed eﬀects, we use ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects in the
second column of the table. As can be seen, the inclusion of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects increase the point
estimates of the coeﬃcients on proﬁtability. In particular, as the second column of Table 2 shows,
βp is now 0.721 (signiﬁcant at the one percent level). Focusing on ﬁrm internal liquidity or leverage
rather than ﬁrm proﬁtability reveals a similar result: labor is sensitive to both liquidity and ﬁrm
leverage. Controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects, the coeﬃcient on liquidity is 0.351. Similarly, leverage
exhibits a negative relation with employment that is about nine times higher than in column 1. 5
In columns 3 and 4 we restrict the analysis to only manufacturing ﬁrms. This results in a
sample size of 27,967 compared to the 51,609 ﬁrm-year observations in our previous sample.6 As
the table shows, our results – especially in speciﬁcations with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects – are similar to those
in columns 1 and 2. As column 3 shows, the coeﬃcient on proﬁtability βp is 0.597 as compared to
0.446 in column 1. Similarly, as column 4 shows, once we control for ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects, βp=0.807
as compared to 0.721 in column 2.
Taken together, these ﬁndings are consistent with the view that ﬁnancial constraints are po-
tentially an important determinant of ﬁrm-level employment decision. These results are related
to Bakke and Whited (2011) that ﬁnds, among other variables, employment growth is related to
mandatory pension contributions. Likewise, these ﬁndings are also similar in spirit to Campello,
Giambona, Graham and Harvey (2010) who use survey evidence to show that credit lines eased the
impact of the recent ﬁnancial crisis on a battery of corporate decisions such as investment, R&D
and employment. However, given the concerns about the endogeneity of proﬁtability, liquidity,
and leverage and the relation between these variables and the economic opportunities available to
ﬁrms, we are cautious at this stage in arguing for a causal link between ﬁnancial measures and
employment.
5While adding ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects control for unobserved heterogeneity at the ﬁrm-level it potentially ampliﬁes the
omitted variable concern. The endogeneity problem is potentially exacerbated when we include ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects
since the estimates are identiﬁed oﬀ of innovations in cash ﬂows, cash holdings or debt that are more likely to be
correlated with innovations in economic opportunities as would be the case in a model of employment without ﬁnancial
constraints. For example, Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994) use corporate cash holdings instead of cash ﬂow in
speciﬁcations that do not include ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects to capture the eﬀect of ‘stale’ variation in corporate liquidity on
inventories. Our results hold whether or not we include ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects.
6We deﬁne manufacturing ﬁrms as those operating in 4-digit SIC 2000-3999.
7B.1 Does Capital Adjustment Drive Labor Sensitivities to Cash-ﬂows?
One potential interpretation of our ﬁndings is that our results are driven solely by capital adjusting
to ﬁnancial constraints. According to this view, ﬁnancial constraints do not aﬀect labor directly
since, unlike capital, labor does not require ﬁnancing. Instead, as in the investment-cash-ﬂow
sensitivity literature, investment is limited by the availability of internal funds, and labor, in turn,
is adjusted for the decline in capital. That is, the sensitivity of labor to cash ﬂows stems from
the omission of investment from the regressions and not from an intrinsic need to ﬁnance labor;
ﬁnancial pressure causes ﬁrms to disinvest which mechanically leads to reduction in their labor
force.7
This alternative view hinges on the notion that while capital requires upfront investment to
smooth the lumpiness associated with ﬁxed costs, labor expenses are variable costs that are paid out
of sales. An extreme variant of this story is the case in which labor is fully paid with the completion
of a transaction – for example as in the case of waiters, bellhops or realtors – and hence labor
hoarding, hiring and ﬁring are unaﬀected by ﬁnancing needs. Still, in most production activities,
and particularly those associated with manufacturing as opposed to services – labor is not paid only
upon the sale of goods in the market, but rather needs to be ﬁnanced throughout the production
process.8 Indeed, the larger sensitivities of employment to cash ﬂows found in the analysis with
manufacturing ﬁrms in Table 2 are consistent with the notion that labor in manufacturing industries
is more likely to require ﬁnancing as compared to labor in service industries.
Nevertheless, even the theoretical argument for labor representing solely a variable cost is not
widely acceptable. Research in labor economics has suggested that labor is not a variable factor of
production but rather a ﬁxed, or at least a quasi-ﬁxed, factor (e.g., Oi (1962), Hamermesh (1989),
Hamermesh and Pfann (1996)) . This argument has been suggested ﬁrst by Oi (1962) who writes:
The cyclical behavior of labor markets reveals a number of puzzling features for which
there are no truly satisfying explanations. [...] I believe that the major impediment to
rational explanations for these phenomena lies in the classical treatment of labor as a
purely variable factor. In this paper I propose a short-run theory of employment which
rests on the premise that labor is a quasi-ﬁxed factor. The ﬁxed employment costs arise
7Garmaise (2008) analyzes capital-labor decisions of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms using small businesses data.
8The argument that labor must be ﬁnanced is similar to that in the literature on ﬁnancial constraints and inventory
investment: ﬁrms must ﬁnance inventory investment during the production process.
8from investments by ﬁrms in hiring and training activities.9
We argue that labor has ﬁxed-costs aspects that require ﬁnancing to bridge upfront costs and
revenues. These may give rise to the role that ﬁnancial constraints play in the inability of ﬁrms
to hoard highly trained employees even when the decline in demand for the ﬁrm’s goods may be
temporary
In order to test the alternative explanation that capital adjustments are fully responsible for
the sensitivity of employment changes to ﬁnancial constraints we directly include contemporane-
ous changes in investment (%∆investment) as well as the concurrent level of scaled investment
(Investment/Assetst−1) in the employment-based regressions of speciﬁcation 1. Results are re-
ported in the last four columns of Table 2. If labor responds to cash-ﬂows only through indirect
complementarities between labor and capital, then controlling for concurrent measures of invest-
ment should fully absorb this eﬀect and βp in these regressions should be equal to zero.
As Table 2 demonstrates, controlling for the contemporaneous changes in investments (%∆investment)
as well as the concurrent level of scaled investment (Investment/Assetst−1) barely aﬀects the eco-
nomic signiﬁcance of our main ﬁndings. Both the percent change in investment and concurrent
investment are positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with employment change, suggesting that
capital and labor indeed move together, probably due to the demand for production factors and
capital-labor complementarities. In particular, the coeﬃcients on the ﬁnancial variables are hardly
aﬀected by the inclusion of investment-based measures. As column 1 shows, when we account for
industry ﬁxed-eﬀects βp declines to 0.336 (compared to 0.446 in column 1 of Table 2). Including
ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects results in a decrease of βp from 0.721 to 0.600. Similar patterns are observed for
the liquidity measure and for manufacturing ﬁrms (columns 7 and 8).10
To summarize, we ﬁnd that labor is sensitive to cash ﬂows even after accounting for the con-
temporaneous changes in investment. Our analysis therefore suggests that the potential eﬀect of
ﬁnancial constraints on employment is unlikely to be driven entirely by an accompanying change
in investment in response to these constraints.
9See Oi (1962) page 538.
10In unreported results we also add as an additional control the 4-digit SIC TFP growth. By doing so we are trying
to control better for investment opportunities making sure our results are not likely to be driven by the omitted
investment opportunities. Our results are unchanged.
9C. Leverage Stratiﬁcation and Employment and Investment Cash-ﬂow Sensi-
tivities
We now turn to test whether the sensitivity of the change in the number of employees is higher for
ﬁrms that are more likely to be ﬁnancially constrained. In particular, we examine how the eﬀects
we document vary with the ﬁnancial leverage of the ﬁrm. To do so we sort manufacturing ﬁrms into
two groups based on their leverage – below and above the median. Sorting ﬁrms based on a-priori
measures of ﬁnancial constraints and estimating investment cash-ﬂow sensitivities has been used in
several previous studies of investment (e.g. Fazzari et al. (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein
(1991), Ramirez (1995) and Rauh (2006)).11
We re-estimate the employment regressions for each of the groups and report the results in
Table 3. All the regressions are estimated with year and either industry of ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects. As
Table 3 shows, the sensitivity of the percentage changes in employment to cash-ﬂows increases
when moving from ﬁrms with leverage below the median to more levered ﬁrms. For example, βp
is 0.569 for high levered ﬁrms as compared to 0.391 for low levered ﬁrms in industry ﬁxed-eﬀects
speciﬁcations, and is 0.897 compared to 0.633 when we include ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects. Similar results
are documented in manufacturing ﬁrms (columns 5-8).
These tests also suggest that measurement error concerns highlighted earlier are not likely
driving our ﬁndings. In particular, one could have plausibly argued that our earlier regressions
evaluating the labor and investment sensitivities suﬀered from measurement error in investment
opportunities – as measured by Q – which in turn is captured partially by ﬁnancial health variables.
Consequently, the relation between ﬁnancial health and employment was spurious and represented
only a mechanical relation between investment opportunities and labor. By demonstrating that
our results increase with leverage, we alleviate some of these endogeneity concerns. The relevant
criticism for our ﬁndings therefore has to be that not only is there measurement error in investment
opportunities – but also that this error has to be worse for highly leveraged ﬁrms. However, it is not
a-priori clear why the measurement error in Q should be correlated with leverage as a stratifying
variable.
11Some other studies discussing the role of ﬁnancial constraints on investment decisions include Whited (1992),
Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994), Calomiris and Hubbard (1995) and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995).
10II. Evidence from Three Quasi-Experiments
Our ﬁndings in Section 1 are consistent with a role of ﬁnancial constraints in ﬁrms’ employment
decisions but are also consistent with a Neoclassical model of investment and labor demand. We
next turn to evidence from three ‘quasi-experiments’ used in the investment-cash ﬂow and ﬁnance-
growth literatures that allow us to more cleanly trace the eﬀects of ﬁnance on employment.
A. The Eﬀects of Maturing Long-term Debt on Employment
We now attempt to alleviate endogeneity concerns about proﬁtability and leverage by using the
‘maturing-debt’ approach pioneered by Almeida et al. (2009). The ‘maturing-debt’ empirical
strategy exploits heterogeneity in the maturity of long-term debt across ﬁrms. The empirical tests
examine whether ﬁrms with long-term debt maturing in a particular year reduce their investment
(as in Almeida et al. (2009)) or labor force (as in our paper) by more than their peers that do not
face the need to reﬁnance maturing long-term debt in the same year. If external capital is costly
(e.g., Myers and Majluf (1984)) then ﬁrms which need to reﬁnance large amounts of maturing
long-term debt will, as a result, adjust their real activity and reduce employment.
The identiﬁcation strategy relies on the assumption that variation in the amount of long-term
debt maturing in any given year is exogenous to corporate outcomes in that particular year. To
lend credence to this assumption, we use as our main independent variable measures of maturing
long-term debt which take into account liabilities that were issued with a time-lag to the year of
interest. For example, we compare employment outcomes of ﬁrms which in a particular year have a
large amount of maturing debt (issued two, three or four years prior to the year we study) to those
with a small amount of such debt maturing. Since this portion of the maturing debt was issued
prior to the year of maturity, variation in its level is arguably exogenous to market conditions and
investment opportunities that eventually arise in the year in which the debt becomes due.
Compustat reports the amount of long-term debt which is payable in more than one year
through more than ﬁve years from the ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year end. We collect data on the amount
of future maturing debt. Speciﬁcally, we utilize Compustat variables dd3, dd4, and dd5 which
represent, respectively, the amount of long-term debt maturing three, four, and ﬁve years after the
annual reporting date. To measure the maturing debt structure of a ﬁrm in a particular year we
construct lagged values of these debt maturity variables: l2 dd3 is the two-year lag of dd3, l3 dd4
11is the three year lag of dd4 and l4 dd5 is the four year lag of dd5. By construction, these variables
measure the amount of long-term debt maturing in the upcoming year of debt that was issued at
least two, three, or four years prior to the base year. For example, at year t, l2 dd3 measures the
amount of long-term debt maturing at t+1 that was issued prior to year t−2. We scale the lagged
variables by beginning of year assets.
Next, we construct a dummy variable that takes on the value of one for those ﬁrms for which
long-term debt coming due in the upcoming year and issued at least t years ago is larger than 5
percent of total assets. We also deﬁne equivalent dummy variables using 10, 15, and 20 percent
threshold levels. These variables capture whether a ﬁrm has a signiﬁcant amount of long term debt
maturing in the upcoming year which requires reﬁnancing. By examining debt that was issued
prior to the year of analysis, we alleviate concerns that the level of maturing debt co-moves with
other market variables which have a direct impact on employment decisions. As control variables
we use the same set of controls as in the previous section. Following Lamont, Kashyap, and Stein
(1994), we also construct a dummy variable which takes on a value of one if a ﬁrm has a credit
rating to measure the ﬁrm’s access to the long-term bond market.12
Table 4 provides summary statistics for the maturing debt variables. The average amount of
debt coming due in the upcoming year with an original maturity of greater than two, three, and
four years equals on average 2.6, 2.4, and 2.3 percent of assets, respectively. We next deﬁne dummy
variables that take the value of 1 if the maturing debt exceeds 5, 10, and 15 percent of the ﬁrm’s
total assets. As the table shows, 13.4 percent of ﬁrm-year observation have reﬁnancing requirements
that exceed 5 percent of total assets and that were issued at least 2 year prior to the year in which
the debt comes due. Turning to higher levels of maturing debt, Table 4 shows that 4.9 percent
of ﬁrm-year observations in the sample must reﬁnance maturing long-term debt that was issued
at least 2 years before the current year and that exceeds 10 percent of total assets. Similarly, 2.5
percent of the sample need to reﬁnance maturing long-term debt that is higher than 15 percent of
total assets.
Having deﬁned the maturing debt variables, our baseline regression speciﬁcation is:
%∆employeesit = α + βLT × (Long term debt due)it + Xit−1λ + ytθ + ziψ + ￿it, (2)
where the dependent variable: %∆employees is the annual percentage change in the number of
12As is standard, we assume that ﬁrms with a missing observation in their credit rating are unrated.
12employees within a ﬁrm. Long term debt dueit is one of the dummy variables described above that
measures whether the value of long-term debt maturing in year t + 1 and issued two, three or
four years prior to year t is greater than 5, or 10 percent of the book value of ﬁrm assets. Xit−1
is a vector of ﬁrm speciﬁc control variables. These include lagged values of the ﬁrm market-to-
book ratio, ﬁrm internal liquidity, Liquidityit−1, the log of the book value of ﬁrm assets, ﬁrm
leverage, asset maturity, proﬁtability, and the credit rating dummy. All regressions include year
ﬁxed eﬀects, yt, and depending on the speciﬁcation also include either four-digit SIC ﬁxed eﬀects
or ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects, denoted by the vector z. All regressions are estimated with heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors which are clustered by ﬁrm. Similar to the analysis in Table 2 we control
for both the contemporaneous change in investment, %∆investment, as well as the concurrent
level of scaled investment (Investment/Assetst−1) to control for the possibility that the eﬀect on
employment is completely driven by an accompanying change in investment and not through a
direct link between the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial position and its ability to retain labor or its need to ﬁre
employees.
Results are presented in Table 5. As column 1 demonstrates, we ﬁnd a negative and statistically
signiﬁcant relation between the maturing long-term debt variable and the change in the number of
ﬁrm employees. The coeﬃcient of -0.017 (statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level) implies that
ﬁrms that have maturing debt that requires reﬁnancing and that is worth at least 5% of the ﬁrm’s
total assets reduce the number of their employees by close to two percent. That is, consistent with
the presence of ﬁnancial frictions, when ﬁrms have a large amount of debt coming to maturity which
must be reﬁnanced, part of their adjustment occurs through a reduction in labor force. As column
2 shows, this negative relation holds when we include ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects as well (coeﬃcient=-0.012,
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level).
Next, we further lag the maturing debt variable to ensure that ﬁnancing decisions do not coincide
in time with employment decisions. As columns 3 and 4 demonstrate, the eﬀect of maturing long-
term debt is negative and statistically signiﬁcant when we study the eﬀect of debt issued at least
3 years prior to the base year. βLT is -0.021 (signiﬁcant at the 1 percent-level) when we include
industry ﬁxed-eﬀects compared to -0.013 (signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level) when we control for
ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects. Likewise, even when we lag debt issuance by 4 years (columns 5 and 6) we ﬁnd
that the eﬀect of maturing debt on employment is negative and signiﬁcant (-0.023 and -0.014 for
industry- or ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively.) We obtain similar results when we repeat the analysis
13using a dummy variable for maturing long-term debt that exceed ten percent of total assets (Table
6). As the table shows, the sensitivity of the change in the number of employees to maturing long-
term debt βLT, is now higher and equals -0.021 which is consistent with a larger reﬁnancing need
than the ﬁve percent-based dummy variable in Table 5. Furthermore, our main result still hold –
and in some speciﬁcations the eﬀect is indeed larger – when we lag the maturing debt variable by
3 or 4 years.
It is also important to note that while we focus our attention on maturing long-term debt as
the key explanatory variable in our regressions, we still obtain the same magnitudes as before for
both the proﬁtability, liquidity and leverage variables. In some sense we are ‘over controlling’ in
these regressions capturing separate eﬀects of cash ﬂow, cash holdings and leverage, while studying
the eﬀect of debt that needs to be rolled-over on each of the dependent variables.
As would be expected, we also ﬁnd that the ﬁrm market-to-book ratio is positively related to
employment growth. Consistent with Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994), we also ﬁnd a positive
relation between ﬁrm internal liquidity and the change in ﬁrm employment levels. In addition,
we ﬁnd that increased leverage predicts lower employment growth. This could be driven by the
fact that ﬁrms in distress increase their leverage ratios, or alternatively, reﬂect ﬁrms’ decision to
reduce their labor force when faced with large future liabilities. We note, though, that the negative
relation between the long-term debt maturity variables and the reduction in the labor force does
not simply reﬂect a leverage eﬀect, as the results hold even after controlling for leverage.
We have also repeated the analysis of regression 2, using diﬀerent threshold levels to deﬁne
signiﬁcant levels of long-term debt. In particular, rather than using 5% and 10% thresholds, we
deﬁne dummy variables that take on the value of one if long-term debt maturing in the upcoming
year is greater than 15 or 20 percent of assets. In unreported results we ﬁnd that the negative
relation between upcoming long-term debt and changes in ﬁrm level employment are robust to
using diﬀerent threshold levels when we control for 4-digit SIC ﬁxed-eﬀects. Further, as would be
expected, the economic signiﬁcance of the eﬀect monotonically increases with the threshold level:
as ﬁrms need to reﬁnance a larger amount of debt, the reduction in employment levels is greater.
However, some of these eﬀects become statistically insigniﬁcant when we add ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects since
there is not suﬃcient within-ﬁrm variation when we require very large maturing debt cutoﬀs for
the dummy variables.
14B. The Eﬀect of Banking Deregulation on Unemployment
In the second ‘quasi-experiment’ we analyze the impact of bank deregulation on the level of state
unemployment. Our methodology follows the seminal work of Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) which
utilizes the introduction of state-level bank deregulation laws across the U.S. Historically, U.S.
banks faced legal restrictions on their ability to expand both within states and across state bor-
ders. The Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 barred, in eﬀect, bank
holding companies from expanding across state borders. In addition, most states had laws placing
restrictions on the ability of bank holding companies to operate multiple branches in-state.
During the mid-1970s, states began to deregulate the banking industry by removing restrictions
on both intrastate and interstate bank branching. States introduced laws that allowed bank holding
companies to consolidate their subsidiaries into branches and to open new branches within state
lines. Furthermore, states passed laws that allowed out-of-state banks to purchase banks within
the state. Bank holding companies were thus enabled to expand across and within state lines.
Prior studies have shown that state bank deregulation led to changes in the local banking industry,
with associated increases in competition, improved bank eﬃciency, reductions in bank loan interest
rates and an increased likelihood of borrowing from banks (see e.g. Flannery (1984), Jayaratne
and Strahan (1996), and Rice and Strahan (2010)). Further, bank deregulation has been shown
to be related to real outcomes such as economic growth (Jayaratne and Strahan (1996)), income
distribution (Beck et al, (2010)), and economic volatility (Demyanyk et al, (2007)). In particular,
while the main focus in Beck et al, (2010) is on the relation between ﬁnance and income inequality,
they also show that banking deregulation laws reduced state-level unemployment.
Following these studies, we use cross-sectional and time-series variation in the introduction of
bank deregulation laws – both inter- and intra- state – to analyze the impact of positive shocks
to banking markets on local unemployment levels. To do so, we collect information on state level
unemployment from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the period 1976-2009. Next, for each state,
we obtain the year of inter- and intra- state banking deregulation. While banking deregulation
occurred throughout the sample period, a large fraction of deregulation activity was concentrated
in the mid- to late 1980s. We use this information to deﬁne two dummy variables, Intrastate Bank
and Interstate Bank. For any particular state, Intrastate Bank, takes on the value of one in all years
following the introduction of the intra-state banking reform in that state. Similarly, Interstate Bank
15takes on the value of one in all years following the introduction of the inter-state banking reform.
Our baseline regression speciﬁcation is then as follows:
UEst = α + β × BankDeregulationst + ytθ + ztψ + ￿st, (3)
where UEst is the level of unemployment at state s at time t, Bank Deregulationst is one of the two
bank deregulation dummy variables Intrastate Bank and Interstate Bank at state s at time t.W e
also include year ﬁxed eﬀects, yt and state ﬁxed-eﬀects, zt. Year ﬁxed eﬀects control for nation-wide
business cycle eﬀects, while state ﬁxed eﬀects control for non time-varying determinants of state
level unemployment such as regulatory predisposition or average tax rates. In some speciﬁcations
we include a state year-trend variable rather than state ﬁxed eﬀects, while in others we include
region by year ﬁxed eﬀects. Regions are deﬁned as in Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and split
the United States into four groups, the Northeast, Midwest, West, and South. All regressions are
estimated with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors which are clustered by state. Since the
last state bank deregulation occurs in 1999 – by the state of Iowa – we run the regressions over the
time period 1976-1999.13 Our data comprises 1,152 state-year level observations.
Results of regression (3) are presented in Table 7. As can be seen, we ﬁnd that banking
deregulation is associated with reduced unemployment. Focusing ﬁrst on intra-state deregulation
(the ﬁrst three columns of the table) we ﬁnd that the introduction of intra-state deregulation
reduces unemployment by between 0.45 and 0.86 percentage points. Since the average level of
unemployment over the sample period is 6.16% percent, the economic magnitude of the eﬀect is
quite substantial. The last three columns of Table 7, analyze the eﬀect of inter-state banking reform.
Here too we ﬁnd a consistent statistically signiﬁcant negative relation between banking reform and
unemployment. The eﬀect also appears to be stronger than that of intra-state reform. Depending
on the speciﬁcation, passing inter-state banking reform laws which allow bank holding companies
to expand across state lines reduces unemployment by between 0.84% and 1.14%, representing
approximately a 15% decrease of the sample mean unemployment rate. Similar results are presented
in Beck et al (2010) who ﬁnd that banking deregulation reduces income inequality and state-level
unemployment, and by Pagano and Pica (2011) who show that across countries employment growth
is associated with ﬁnancial development.
13Our results are robust to including additional years in the sample period to allow for a lag in the eﬀect of banking
deregulation.
16While the results in Table 7 point to an important link between credit and unemployment they
do not pin down the channel through which bank deregulation increase employment. However,
coupled with prior evidence in the literature that points to an increase in bank loan allocation eﬃ-
ciency, reduction in interest rates, and diminishing economic volatility following bank deregulation,
the results suggest that positive shocks to the ﬁnancial intermediation environment within which
businesses operate may have an important eﬀect on ﬁrm employment outcomes.
C. The Eﬀect of Japan’s Real Estate Decline on Unemployment in the U.S.
We now provide more evidence on the link between ﬁnance and employment using a credit supply-
shock experiment. We exploit a plausibly exogenous shock to bank loans supply in certain ge-
ographic areas in the U.S. and trace its impact on local unemployment rates. In particular, we
study the contraction of loans made by Japanese aﬃliated banks in the U.S. during the early 1990s
following the sharp economic downturn in Japan. As discussed in Peek and Rosengren (2000), this
contraction in credit was due to negative shocks to the balance sheet of the Japanese parent banks
of these aﬃliates as a result of the dramatic decline in real estate prices in Japan. While Japanese
real estate shocks were relatively exogenous to investment opportunities of ﬁrms in the U.S., they
led to a contraction in lending in U.S. regions in which Japanese aﬃliated banks were present.
At their peak in 1992, the penetration of Japanese banks in many real estate markets in the
U.S. was strikingly large.14 This suggests that the contraction of such loans to ﬁrms in the vicinity
of these banks could have a signiﬁcant impact on the ﬁnancial health of these ﬁrms – for instance by
making reﬁnancing of such loans diﬃcult. In addition, reduction in real estate lending by Japanese-
aﬃliated banks is also likely to be correlated with reduction in other type of credit by these banks.15
The empirical strategy we follow mirrors Peek and Rosengren (2000) and seeks to trace out the
impact of contraction of real estate loans by Japanese aﬃliated banks on unemployment in U.S.
regions with substantial presence of these banks before the real estate collapse in Japan. The
identiﬁcation assumption relies on the notion that due to asymmetric information in lending, U.S-
based ﬁrms in the vicinity of Japanese-aﬃliated banks will ﬁnd it diﬃcult to switch banks and
14Peek and Rosengren (2000) note that, at their peak in 1992, U.S. subsidiaries and branches of Japanese banking
organizations accounted for one-ﬁfth of all commercial real estate loans held by domestically owned commercial
banks plus foreign bank subsidiaries and branches in the United States. In many major urban markets, the Japanese
penetration was far more substantial. Japanese branches and subsidiaries accounted at their peak for 44 percent
of commercial real estate loans by large ($300 million or more in assets) U.S. commercial banks and foreign bank
aﬃliates located in California, 35 percent in New York State, and 23 percent in Illinois.
15In our empirical analysis we conﬁrm that this is indeed the case.
17escape the supply-side contraction in credit.
The data for this experiment come from call reports provided by Chicago Federal Reserve
Bank. In particular, we construct the market share (in terms of real estate loans) for Japanese
owned banks in a given MSA. We follow Peek and Rosengren (2000) and ﬁrst identify those entities
that have a foreign owner (top holder) that is Japanese. We include those banks and branches
where the entity has a U.S bank charter as well as branches of banks that do not have a U.S.
charter. For each MSA, we create a panel data set that includes all large domestically owned
commercial banks located in the state that hold real estate loans in their portfolios, as well as
Japanese bank branches and subsidiaries within the MSA. The domestically owned banks in these
markets provide a comparison group for determining whether Japanese-owned banks presence has
a diﬀerential eﬀect on unemployment during the real estate crisis in Japan. Similar to Peek and
Rosengren (2000) we restrict our analysis to MSAs where Japanese banks were present before the
real estate peak in Japan in 1991.
The resulting dataset that we use is similar to the one reported in Peek and Rosengren (2000).
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that MSAs in eight states have Japanese-bank-aﬃliate operations: California,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, New York, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. Two other states (Hawaii
and Massachusetts) have Japanese bank presence for part of the sample period.16
We use Japanese aﬃliate real estate lending (log of total real estate loans by Japanese bank
branches and subsidiaries located in a MSA) as an explanatory variable in explaining MSA un-
employment levels. We obtain data on MSA level unemployment for the sample period from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The other control variables include lagged log of state GDP, lagged log
of labor force in the area and lagged share of Japanese aﬃliate real estate lending relative to total
real estate loans made by commercial banks in that MSA. We also include state ﬁxed eﬀects and a
time trend to account for secular trends in unemployment and cluster the standard errors at MSA
level. The data spans the years 1990 to 1996.
As column 1 of Table 8 demonstrates, real estate lending by Japanese banks and aﬃliates does
not explain MSA-level unemployment. In contrast, column 2 shows that, real estate lending by non-
Japanese banks (deﬁned as log of total real estate loans by non-Japanese aﬃliated banks located in
a MSA) has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on unemployment during the same period
16The results reported in Table 8 include Hawaii and Massachusetts but are robust if we drop these states from
our analysis.
18suggesting that, in general, non-Japanese bank presence has a larger eﬀect on unemployment. The
results in columns 1 & 2 provide average correlations across the sample period rather than the
isolated eﬀect of credit contraction by Japanese aﬃliated banks due to real estate decline in Japan.
We now turn to the main empirical results in which we identify this eﬀect.
We exploit time-series variation in the real-estate market in Japan using an annual Japanese real
estate index as an instrument for the decline in U.S. lending by Japanese-aﬃliated banks. Column
3 present the results obtained from the ﬁrst stage of regressing lending on the Japanese real-estate
index. Other controls in this regression are the same as those in column 1. As can be seen from
the table, there is a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the Japanese real estate index
on real estate lending by the Japanese aﬃliated banks in the U.S. during the sample period. The
eﬀects are economically signiﬁcant as well. In particular, the decline in real estate index between
1993 and 1995 (about a 40 point change) led to about 16% decline in lending by Japanese aﬃliates
around its mean level (40 ∗ .0055/1.43).
We then assess how this translates into local unemployment by estimating a two-stage least-
squares speciﬁcation – instrumenting the Japanese aﬃliated lending by the Japanese real estate
index – in column 4. As our results demonstrate, the IV estimates suggest that unemployment sig-
niﬁcantly increases in MSAs in which there was a contraction in Japanese aﬃliated banks following
the real estate decline in Japan. These results are robust to the inclusion of state ﬁxed-eﬀect as
well as time trends and state-trends in addition to additional controls. These eﬀects are econom-
ically large as well. The 16% contraction in lending by Japanese aﬃliated banks discussed above
lead to a one percentage point increase in MSA-level unemployment. This is a reasonably large
eﬀect relative to mean unemployment rate of around 7.5% for these MSAs during the period of our
analysis. These ﬁndings are consistent with those in Peek and Rosengren (2000) who show a drop
in employment growth of construction workers in states with Japanese-aﬃliated lending after the
real-estate collapse in Japan in early 1990s. However, our ﬁndings represent a broader decline in
unemployment since we examine the impact of credit supply shock on unemployment rates across
sectors within MSAs.
We next assess the robustness of our ﬁndings by conducting a placebo test. In particular, we
estimate similar regressions as those in columns 3-5 instrumenting the non-Japanese aﬃliated bank
lending by the Japanese real estate index. If the instrument is valid then changes in the real estate
index in Japan should not be correlated with changes in the non-Japanese aﬃliated bank lending
19– and therefore should not correlate with changes in unemployment in the second stage. As can
be observed in column 6, the ﬁrst stage reveals that there is no correlation between movements of
Japanese real estate index and real estate lending by the non-Japanese aﬃliated banks in the US.
Moreover, the second stage IV regressions in columns 7 and 8 produce a statistically insigniﬁcant
relationship between unemployment and non-Japanese aﬃliated bank lending. These tests therefore
alleviate endogeneity concerns and concerns that the results found earlier are driven by spurious
correlation.
Finally, in unreported tests we conﬁrm that the reduction in real estate lending by Japanese-
aﬃliated banks is also correlated with reduction in other type of credit by these banks. All the
results reported in this section are qualitatively similar if we use total loans instead of real estate
loans granted by Japanese and non-Japanese aﬃliated banks. Overall, we ﬁnd a strong relationship
between loan supply contraction and higher unemployment which further corroborates our central
thesis that credit aﬀects employment.
III. Conclusion
We analyze the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints, maturing debt, bank deregulation and bank balance-
sheets shocks on ﬁrm employment and local-unemployment outcomes. By doing so we provide a
collage of evidence showing that labor is sensitive to ﬁnancial constraints and that unemployment is
aﬀected by the provision of bank credit. This leads us to conclude that ﬁnance plays an important
role in ﬁrm-level employment decisions. While most of our results are based on micro-level data or
local unemployment, our study has a broader message. Financial constraints and the availability
of credit are important for employment and can potentially amplify variation in employment levels
over the business cycle.
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22Appendix A: Variable description and construction
For reference, the following is a list of the main variables used in the paper, their construction and
their sources.
%∆ employees : the percentage change in number of employees from t-1 to t [Compustat
annual item emp]. (source: Compustat).
%∆ investment: the percentage change in investment from t-1 to t [Compustat annual item
capx]. (source: Compustat).
I/K: capital expenditure scaled by beginning of period’s assets. [Compustat annual item
capxt divided by att−1]. (source: Compustat).
Size: either the dollar book value or the natural logarithm of the book value of the assets
[Compustat annual Item at] (Source: Compustat).
Market to Book: book value of assets [Compustat annual item at] plus the market value of
equity [Compustat annual items at+(csho*prcc f)] minus the book value of equity and deferred
taxes [Compustat annual item ceq+txdb], all over (book value of assets*0.9 [Compustat annual
item at]+market value of assets*0.10. (Source: Compustat).
Proﬁtability: EBITDA [Compustat annual item oibdp] over beginning of period assets [Com-
pustat annual item at] (Source: Compustat).
Leverage: total debt [Compustat annual items dltt+dlc+dclo] divided by total assets [Com-
pustat annual item at]. (Source: Compustat).
Asset maturity: net property, plant, and equipment [Compustat annual item ppegt]d i v i d e d
by annual depreciation expenses [Compustat annual item dp]. (Source: Compustat).
Liquidity: cash plus marketable securities [Compustat annual item cashplus] divided by total
assets [Compustat annual item at] (Source: Compustat).
Long-term debt due issued t years ago: a dummy that take the value of 1 if the amount of
long-term debt maturing t+1 years after the annual reporting date [Compustat annual item
dd3] lagged by t years divided by total assets [Compustat annual item at] is higher than 5%,
10%, 15% or 20%. (Source: Compustat).
Credit Rating Dummy: A dummy variable that takes the value of one and zero otherwise,
if the ﬁrm has an S&P Long-Term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating. (Source: Standard and
Poors).
23Table 1:
Descriptive Statistics: Main Variables
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. We report mean, median, 25th
and 75th percentiles, standard deviation and the minimum and maximum values of these variables. Appendix A provides
information on construction and deﬁnitions of these variables.
25th 75th Standard
Mean Percentile Median Percentile Deviation Min Max
Employees 13,075 1,300 3,100 9,800 36,400 500 876,800
%∆ employees 6.043% -4.213% 1.688% 10.280% 24.683% -70.782% 239.906%
%∆ investment 12.570% -29.323% -2.914% 29.640% 82.676% -99.964% 1137.991%
Investment/Assetst−1 0.082 0.033 0.060 0.102 0.079 0.000 0.913
Sizet−1 724.116 36.557 113.156 476.125 2,379.384 1.238 81,380.850
Asset Maturityt−1 16.275 10.183 14.475 19.554 9.536 0.713 99.211
Qt−1 1.366 0.938 1.139 1.549 0.710 0.274 9.576
Liquidityt−1 0.096 0.017 0.048 0.122 0.125 0.000 0.974
Leveraget−1 0.292 0.142 0.280 0.408 0.210 0.000 5.106
Proﬁtabilityt 0.149 0.093 0.140 0.200 0.106 -1.932 0.621
Credit rating dummyt−1 0.430 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.495 0.000 1.000
24Table 2:
Employment, Investment and Cash Flow
This table reports the results of regressions relating employment decision of ﬁrms to their cash ﬂows for all non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms
and manufacturing ﬁrms in our sample. Manufacturing ﬁrms are deﬁned to be those that are operating in 4-digit SIC 2000-3999.
The dependent variable used in the regressions is %∆employees.A l lr e g r e s s i o n si n c l u d el a g g e dv a l u e so ft h eﬁ r mm a r k e t - t o - b o o k
ratio, ﬁrm internal liquidity, the log of the book value of ﬁrm assets, ﬁrm leverage, asset maturity, proﬁtability, the credit rating
dummy and year ﬁxed eﬀects. We also include four-digit SIC ﬁxed eﬀects or ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in these regressions. We control
for contemporaneous change in investment as well as for the concurrent level of scaled investment in last four regressions. All
regressions are estimated with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors which are clustered by ﬁrm and reported in parentheses.
Variable deﬁnitions are provided in Appendix A. a, b and c denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
All non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms Manufacturing ﬁrms only All non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms Manufacturing ﬁrms only
%∆ %∆ %∆ %∆ %∆ %∆ %∆ %∆
employees employees employees employees employees employees employees employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Qt−1 0.043 a 0.039 a 0.012 b 0.011 c 0.030 a 0.027 a 0.007 0.009 a
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Liquidityt−1 0.283 a 0.351 a 0.293 a 0.316 a 0.275 a 0.340 a 0.283 a 0.298 a
(0.018) (0.026) (0.022) (0.033) (0.016) (0.024) (0.020) (0.030)
Log sizet−1 -0.007 a 0.033 a -0.008 a 0.039 a -0.004 a 0.036 a -0.005 a 0.043 a
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005)
Leveraget−1 -0.013 c -0.096 a 0.007 -0.080 a 0.011 -0.060 a 0.013 -0.057 a
(0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.017) (0.008) (0.013) (0.010) (0.016)
Asset 0.002 a 0.005 a 0.001 a 0.006 a 0.001 a 0.003 a 0.0001 0.004 a
maturityt−1 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001)
Proﬁtabilityt 0.446 a 0.721 a 0.597 a 0.807 a 0.336 a 0.600 a 0.477 a 0.701 a
(0.027) (0.035) (0.031) (0.040) (0.025) (0.035) (0.029) (0.038)
%∆ investmentt 0.023 a 0.020 a 0.027 a 0.026 a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
I/Kt 0.676 a 0.595 a 0.583 a 0.429 a
(0.030) (0.039) (0.048) (0.056)
Adjusted R
2 0.15 0.29 0.15 0.27 0.19 0.32 0.18 0.29
Fixed-Eﬀects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit SIC Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Firm No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 51,609 51,609 27,967 27,967 51,609 51,609 27,967 27,967
25Table 3:
Employment and Investment Cash Flow Sensitivities: Stratiﬁed by Leverage
This table reports the results of regressions relating employment decision of ﬁrms to their cash ﬂows estimated in samples stratiﬁed by
leverage. The ﬁrst four speciﬁcations are estimated using non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms while last four speciﬁcations use only manufacturing ﬁrms.
Manufacturing ﬁrms are deﬁned to be those that are operating in 4-digit SIC 2000-3999. The dependent variable used in the regressions
is %∆employees.A l lr e g r e s s i o n si n c l u d el a g g e dv a l u e so ft h eﬁ r mm a r k e t - t o - b o o kr a t i o ,ﬁ r mi n t e r n a ll i q u i d i t y ,t h el o go ft h eb o o kv a l u e
of ﬁrm assets, ﬁrm leverage, asset maturity, proﬁtability, the credit rating dummy and year ﬁxed eﬀects. We also include four-digit
SIC ﬁxed eﬀects or ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in these regressions. All regressions are estimated with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors
which are clustered by ﬁrm and reported in parentheses. Variable deﬁnitions are provided in Appendix A. a, b and c denote statistical
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
All non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms Manufacturing ﬁrms only
Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage
low high low high low high low high
%∆ %∆ %∆ %∆ %∆ %∆ %∆ %∆
employees employees employees employees employees employees employees employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Qt−1 0.045 a 0.055 a 0.034 a 0.064 a 0.015 a 0.021 b 0.003 0.038 a
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013)
Liquidityt−1 0.270 a 0.395 a 0.324 a 0.487 a 0.307 a 0.334 a 0.321 a 0.370 a
(0.020) (0.035) (0.031) (0.055) (0.026) (0.040) (0.041) (0.071)
Log sizet−1 -0.011 a -0.006 a 0.028 a 0.040 a -0.010 a -0.008 a 0.033 a 0.053 a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008)
Leveraget−1 0.123 a -0.060 a -0.068 a -0.141 a 0.124 a -0.060 a -0.085 b -0.093 a
(0.022) (0.013) (0.032) (0.020) (0.027) (0.017) (0.038) (0.026)
Asset maturityt−1 0.001 c 0.002 a 0.005 a 0.005 a 0.001 0.002 a 0.006 a 0.006 a
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Proﬁtabilityt 0.391 a 0.569 a 0.633 a 0.897 a 0.561 a 0.708 a 0.751 a 0.905 a
(0.034) (0.039) (0.044) (0.055) (0.035) (0.057) (0.046) (0.071)
Adjusted R
2 0.17 0.13 0.37 0.27 0.16 0.14 0.34 0.23
Fixed-Eﬀects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit SIC Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Firm No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 25,812 25,797 25,812 25,797 16,687 11,280 16,687 11,280
26Table 4:
Maturing Long-term Debt Approach: Summary Statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis that uses the ‘maturity-debt’ approach. In Panel A we report
the summary statistics of the amount of long-term debt coming due in the upcoming year as a percent of assets. In Panels B, C and D we
report summary statistics of the dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the maturing debt exceeds 5 percent, 10 percent and 15 percent
of the ﬁrm’s total assets, respectively. In each of the panels we take the long-term debt coming due in the upcoming year with an original
maturity of greater than two, three, and four years. We report mean, median, 25th and 75th percentiles, standard deviation and the minimum
and maximum values of these variables. Appendix A provides information on construction and deﬁnitions of these variables.
25th 75th Standard
Mean Percentile Median Percentile Deviation Min Max
Panel A: Long-term debt due to total assets
Long-term debt due issued 2 years ago 0.026 0.001 0.011 0.030 0.053 0.000 2.844
Long-term debt due issued 3 years ago 0.024 0.0007 0.009 0.026 0.052 0.000 1.888
Long-term debt due issued 4 years ago 0.023 0.0003 0.008 0.024 0.058 0.000 2.365
Panel B: Long-term debt due>5% of total assets (dummy variables)
Long-term debt due issued 2 years ago 0.134 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.340 0.000 1.000
Long-term debt due issued 3 years ago 0.116 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.320 0.000 1.000
Long-term debt due issued 4 years ago 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.314 0.000 1.000
Panel C: Long-term debt due>10% of total assets (dummy variables)
Long-term debt due issued 2 years ago 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.215 0.000 1.000
Long-term debt due issued 3 years ago 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.199 0.000 1.000
Long-term debt due issued 4 years ago 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.000 1.000
Panel D: Long-term debt due>15% of total assets (dummy variables)
Long-term debt due issued 2 years ago 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.157 0.000 1.000
Long-term debt due issued 3 years ago 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.146 0.000 1.000
Long-term debt due issued 4 years ago 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.152 0.000 1.000
27Table 5:
The Eﬀect of Maturing Long-term Debt on Employment
(Maturing Debt at least 5% of Firm’s Assets)
This table reports the results of regressions relating employment decision of ﬁrms to their maturing long-term debt for
ﬁrms in our sample. The dependent variable used in the regressions is %∆employees.A l lr e g r e s s i o n si n c l u d el a g g e d
values of the ﬁrm market-to-book ratio, ﬁrm internal liquidity, the log of the book value of ﬁrm assets, ﬁrm leverage,
asset maturity, proﬁtability, the credit rating dummy and year ﬁxed eﬀects. We also control for contemporaneous
investment change in the ﬁrm. The regressions also include four-digit SIC ﬁxed eﬀects or ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. All
regressions are estimated with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors which are clustered by ﬁrm and reported in
parentheses. Variable deﬁnitions are provided in Appendix A. a, b and c denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
Long-term debt due>5% of total assets
%∆ %∆ %∆ %∆ %∆ %∆
employees employees employees employees employees employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Long-term debt due -0.017 a -0.012 b
issued 2 years ago (0.004) (0.005)
Long-term debt due -0.021 a -0.013 b
issued 3 years ago (0.004) (0.005)
Long-term debt due -0.023 a -0.014 a
issued 4 years ago (0.005) (0.005)
%∆ investmentt 0.032 a 0.025 a 0.033 a 0.026 a 0.030 a 0.024 a
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
I/Kt 0.632 a 0.572 a 0.629 a 0.583 a 0.611 a 0.581 a
(0.048) (0.067) (0.049) (0.068) (0.050) (0.070)
Qt−1 0.013 b 0.003 0.009 a 0.002 0.009 b 0.003
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Liquidityt−1 0.252 a 0.347 a 0.240 a 0.317 a 0.246 a 0.317 a
(0.020) (0.035) (0.020) (0.034) (0.020) (0.034)
Log sizet−1 0.005 a 0.058 a 0.006 a 0.059 a 0.006 a 0.054 a
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
Leveraget−1 0.014 -0.048 a 0.016 -0.049 a 0.017 -0.051 a
(0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.018) (0.011) (0.019)
Asset maturityt−1 0.001 c 0.004 a 0.001 b 0.004 a 0.001 a 0.004 a
(0.0003) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001)
Credit rating -0.027 a -0.035 a -0.030 a -0.036 a -0.031 a -0.043 a
dummyt−1 (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009)
Proﬁtabilityt 0.382 a 0.684 a 0.414 a 0.702 a 0.433 a 0.711 a
(0.031) (0.044) (0.031) (0.044) (0.030) (0.046)
Adjusted R
2 0.17 0.29 0.17 0.29 0.17 0.30
Fixed-Eﬀects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit SIC Yes No Yes No Yes No
Firm No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 25,374 25,374 24,940 24,940 23,779 23,779
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The Eﬀect of Maturing Long-term Debt on Employment
(Maturing Debt at least 10% of Firm’s Assets)
This table reports the results of regressions relating employment decision of ﬁrms to their maturing long-term debt for
ﬁrms in our sample. The dependent variable used in the regressions is %∆employees.A l lr e g r e s s i o n si n c l u d el a g g e d
values of the ﬁrm market-to-book ratio, ﬁrm internal liquidity, the log of the book value of ﬁrm assets, ﬁrm leverage,
asset maturity, proﬁtability, the credit rating dummy and year ﬁxed eﬀects. We also control for contemporaneous
investment change in the ﬁrm. The regressions also include four-digit SIC ﬁxed eﬀects or ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. All
regressions are estimated with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors which are clustered by ﬁrm and reported in
parentheses. Variable deﬁnitions are provided in Appendix A. a, b and c denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
Long-term debt due>10% of total assets
%∆ %∆ %∆ %∆ %∆ %∆
employees employees employees employees employees employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Long-term debt due -0.021 a -0.013 c
issued 2 years ago (0.006) (0.007)
Long-term debt due -0.029 a -0.013 c
issued 3 years ago (0.006) (0.007)
Long-term debt due -0.027 a -0.013 c
issued 4 years ago (0.007) (0.007)
%∆ investmentt 0.031 a 0.025 a 0.033 a 0.026 a 0.030 a 0.024 a
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
I/Kt 0.633 a 0.574 a 0.630 a 0.585 a 0.614 a 0.583 a
(0.048) (0.067) (0.049) (0.068) (0.050) (0.070)
Qt−1 0.013 b 0.003 0.010 b 0.002 0.009 b 0.003
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Liquidityt−1 0.253 a 0.347 a 0.240 a 0.317 a 0.247 a 0.316 a
(0.020) (0.035) (0.020) (0.034) (0.020) (0.034)
Log sizet−1 0.005 a 0.058 a 0.005 a 0.059 a 0.006 a 0.054 a
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
Leveraget−1 0.012 -0.050 a 0.014 -0.051 a 0.015 -0.052 a
(0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.019)
Asset maturityt−1 0.001 c 0.004 a 0.001 b 0.004 a 0.001 a 0.004 a
(0.0003) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001)
Credit rating -0.027 a -0.035 a -0.030 a -0.036 a -0.032 a -0.044 a
dummyt−1 (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009)
Proﬁtabilityt 0.382 a 0.684 a 0.414 a 0.702 a 0.433 a 0.711 a
(0.031) (0.044) (0.031) (0.044) (0.030) (0.046)
Adjusted R
2 0.17 0.29 0.17 0.29 0.17 0.30
Fixed-Eﬀects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit SIC Yes No Yes No Yes No
Firm No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 25,374 25,374 24,940 24,940 23,779 23,779
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Banking Deregulation and Unemployment
This table reports the results of regressions relating unemployment rates to the passing of state-level bank deregulation
laws . The dependent variable is the state-level unemployment rates over the sample period 1976-1999. For each state,
the two independent variables, Intra-bank deregulation and Inter-bank deregulation are dummy variables taking on
the values of one in years following the passage of the state Intra- and Inter- banking deregulation laws. Region ﬁxed
eﬀects are deﬁned based on four U.S. geographic regions: Northeast, Midwest, West, and South. All regressions are
estimated with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors which are clustered by state and are reported in parentheses.
a, b and c denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment
Intra-bank -0.449 c -0.856 b -0.556 b
deregulation (0.236) (0.359) (0.227)
Inter-bank - 0.839 a -1.081 a -1.142 a
deregulation (0.280) (0.286) (0.257)
Adjusted R
2 0.74 0.78 0.74 0.74 0.78 0.75
Fixed-Eﬀects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State trends No Yes No No Yes No
Region*Year No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152
30Table 8:
Lending and Unemployment: The Eﬀect of the Japanese Bank Crisis
This table reports the results of regressions relating unemployment rates in the U.S. to the lending by Japanese-aﬃliated banks
during the real estate decline in Japan. The dependent variable is MSA-level unemployment rate over the sample period 1990-
1996. For each MSA, we construct an independent variable, Japanese-aﬃliate lending which is the log of total real estate loans
by Japanese bank branches and subsidiaries located in a MSA. Similarly, we construct the independent variable non-Japanese
aﬃliate lending as the log of total real estate loans by non-Japanese commercial banks located in a MSA. These regressions
all include time trends and state ﬁxed eﬀects. We also include state year trend ﬁxed eﬀects in two speciﬁcations reported in
the table. All regressions are estimated with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors which are clustered by MSA and are
reported in parentheses. a, b and c denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. a, b and c denote
statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
OLS First IV First IV
Stage Stage
Unemployment Japanese Unemployment Non-Japanese Unemployment
lending lending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Japanese 0.070 -5.194a -4.290a
lending (0.123) (1.855) (1.332)
Non-Japanese -0.756b 54.97 -51.14
lending (0.291) (117.9) (821.9)
Real Estate 0.006a -0.0005
Index (0.002) (0.001)
GDPt−1 -3.918a -3.057b 5.567 -0.755 -57.15 6.794
(1.341) (1.425) (4.664) (4.457) (111.2) (476.0)
Labor forcet−1 -0.676 0.368 10.39b 8.490a -65.63 60.00
(0.435) (0.469) (4.118) (2.989) (139.5) (972.8)
Japanese -0.433 4.235 288.1c 238.6c -55.69 59.72
sharet−1 (9.414) (8.481) (163.4) (126.7) (160.0) (913.2)
Adjusted R
2 0.297 0.317 0.693 . . 0.813 . .
Other Controls Yes Yes
Time-trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed-Eﬀects
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State trend No No No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 684 684 684 684 684 684 684 684
Treated 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68
31